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ARGUMENT 
The Court has now received amicus briefs from the United States, the 
legislative and executive branches of Utah’s government, the national and local 
chapters of the American Civil Liberties Union, and a broad array of legal 
educators, advocates, and practitioners relating to whether this Court can, and 
should, “enact[] . . . a state law” permitting undocumented immigrants to practice 
law in Utah.  The arguments set forth overwhelmingly demonstrate that this Court 
may enact a rule authorizing admission of undocumented immigrants to the 
practice of law, that such a rule would satisfy the “enactment of a State law” 
provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d), and this Court should adopt such a rule to allow 
otherwise qualified undocumented immigrants to apply for admission to the 
practice of law. 
Of all the amici, only the United States expressly opposes the petition.  As 
discussed below, the Utah Legislature takes no position on whether the Court 
should adopt the proposed rule, and the Utah Attorney General suggests the Court 
delay adoption of a rule unless and until the Legislature authorizes other 
professional licenses.  Both branches agree, however, that the Court could adopt a 
rule that would satisfy 8 U.S.C. § 1621(d).  All remaining amici filed briefs in 
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support of Petitioners, and Petitioners agree with and join in the arguments raised 
by supporting amici as set forth below.   
I. RESPONSE TO UTAH STATE AMICI AND SUPPORTING AMICI 
Both the executive and legislative branches of the Utah state government 
agree that this Court has the authority and is the proper body to enact a rule 
granting undocumented immigrants eligibility for admission to practice law in the 
State.  While the Utah Legislature expresses concern with characterizing 
rulemaking by this Court as “enactment of a State law,” the Legislature recognizes 
that licensure to practice law in Utah is “not subject to legislative authority” and is 
instead “a province of the Court” pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4 of the Utah 
Constitution.  Br. of Amicus Curiae Utah Legislature (“Legislature Br.”) at 2-4.  
The Legislature accordingly agrees with Petitioners that, if read to require the 
Legislature to pass a law granting undocumented immigrants eligibility for law 
licenses, Section 1621(d) would violate the Tenth Amendment because it would 
purport “to require the Legislature to perform a function that the Utah Constitution 
delegates to the Court.”  Id. at 7.  Moreover, the Legislature is of the view that 
“how Utah chooses to make decisions relating to the eligibility for admission to 
practice law is ‘not a legitimate concern of the federal government,’” but rather a 
matter committed to the sound discretion of this Court.  Id. at 10 (quoting In re 
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Vargas, 131 A.D. 3rd 4, 25 (N.Y. App. Div 2015)).  The Legislature accordingly 
takes no position on whether the Court should adopt such a rule, but recognizes 
that the Court would be the proper entity to do so.  Id.  Like the Legislature, the 
Utah Attorney General recognizes the exclusive authority of this Court to regulate 
the practice of law by rule.  Br. of Amicus Curiae the Office of the Attorney 
General (“Attorney General Br.”) at 10-11.  The Attorney General goes one step 
further than the Legislature to conclude that promulgation of a rule by this Court 
constitutes “enactment of a State law” under Section 1621(d), but arrives at the 
same conclusion—that this Court is the only body constitutionally permitted to 
authorize the practice of law by undocumented immigrants, and any interpretation 
of Section 1621(d) requiring a legislative act would violate the anticommandeering 
principles of the Tenth Amendment.  Id. at 9-11.  Unlike the Legislature, the 
Attorney General counsels the Court to adopt a “wait and see” approach, 
authorizing the practice of law by undocumented immigrants only if the 
Legislature first passes a statute allowing undocumented immigrants to obtain 
other professional licenses.  With due respect to the Attorney General, his urging to 
follow the Legislature’s policy lead is mistaken.  First, different types of 
professional licenses implicate different policy considerations—including public 
safety and trust in licensed professionals, the risk posed to the public by unlicensed 
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practitioners, and the impact of licensing decisions on access to and cost of 
professional services.  With respect to the practice of law, these considerations are 
uniquely within this Court’s expertise and experience.  The Legislature’s decision 
to extend to (or withhold from) undocumented immigrants other professional 
licenses thus has no bearing on whether undocumented immigrants should be 
eligible to practice law. Second, and more importantly, this Court should not cede 
its constitutional authority to regulate the legal profession to another branch of 
government.  This is a central point of the Legislature’s own brief—that it is solely 
the Court’s province to determine the eligibility of undocumented immigrants to 
practice law.  Legislature Br. at 6-7.  Whether a class of otherwise qualified 
applicants should be eligible for admission to practice law in this State is not—and 
should not—be conditioned on whether the Legislature first acts to permit those 
persons access to other professional licenses. 
In any event, Petitioners agree with the Legislature and Attorney General 
that this Court must avoid an interpretation of Section 1621 that would conflict 
with the Tenth Amendment.  Legislature Br. at 7-10; Attorney General Br. at 8-11.  
This argument is joined by all amici aside from the United States. 
Petitioners also agree with and join the chorus of amici who argue this Court 
may, consistent with the plain meaning of Section 1621(d), “enact[] a State law” 
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making undocumented immigrants eligible for bar admission.  8 U.S.C. §1621(d).  
The term “enact” means “to make into law by authoritative act.”  Black’s Law 
Dictionary, 643 (10th Ed. 2014).  The term “law” refers to “[t]he set of rules or 
principles dealing with a specific area,” id. at 1015, and the term “state law” refers 
to the “body of law in a particular state consisting of the state’s constitution, 
statutes, regulations, and common law.”  Black’s Law Dictionary, 1416 (7th Ed. 
1999).  And the text of the statute—”through the enactment of a State law,” is 
passive, suggesting Congress did not want to limit a state’s ability to opt out of 
Section 1621(a) to a particular branch of government.  See generally Br. of Amici 
Curiae The American Civil Liberties Union and ACLU of Utah (“ACLU Br.”) at 
6-26; LatinoJustice’s Amicus Curiae Br. at 27-30; Parr Brown Gee & Loveless, 
P.C.’s (“Parr Brown”) Amicus Curiae Br. at 7-9; University of Utah, S.J. Quinney 
College of Law Amicus Curiae Br. at 10-13; Attorney General Br. at 3-8.  
Accordingly, this Court need not reach Petitioner’s argument, joined by all amici 
curiae except the United States, that any contrary interpretation would violate the 
Tenth Amendment and principles of federalism and state sovereignty. 
Petitioners also agree with amici Ad Hoc Coalition of Utah Law Professors 
(“Utah Law Professors”) and Parr Brown that a license to practice law in Utah is 
not a “State or local public benefit” as defined in Section 1621(c)(1) because it is 
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not  “provided by an agency of a State or local government or by appropriated 
funds of a State or local government.”  8 U.S.C. § 1621(c)(1)(A).  The Utah 
Supreme Court, which approves all Utah law licenses pursuant to Rule 14-104(c) 
of the Supreme Court Rules of Professional Practice, is not an “agency of a State 
or local government”—it is an independent branch of state government.  See Parr 
Brown Br. at 3-7; Utah Law Professors Br. at 7-10.  Furthermore, Utah does not 
fund law licenses with “appropriated funds of a State or local government.”  8 
U.S.C. § 1621(c)(1)(A).  Instead, applicants and attorneys support the licensing 
process with admissions, licensing and other fees paid by applicants and attorneys 
to the Utah State Bar, a private, non-governmental organization that administers 
attorney admissions for the Court.  Parr Brown Br. at 5-7; Utah Law Professors Br. 
at 11-15 & Ex. B.  A license to practice law in Utah is therefore outside the scope 
of 8 U.S.C. § 1621, and this Court may adopt a rule making undocumented 
immigrants eligible for admission to the practice of law regardless of whether such 
a rule would constitute “enactment of a State law” under that statute. 
II. RESPONSE TO THE UNITED STATES 
The United States, for its part, opposes the Petition on two grounds.  First, 
the United States argues that this Court should decline to enact a rule authorizing 
bar admission to otherwise eligible undocumented immigrants—including DACA 
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recipients–because DACA is based on an exercise of agency enforcement 
discretion that the Department of Homeland Security purported to rescind on 
September 5, 2017.  Br. of United States as Amicus Curiae (“United States Br.”) at 
7-8; see also Elaine C. Duke, Acting Secretary, DHS, Memorandum on Rescission 
of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) (Sept. 5. 2017) (“Duke Mem.”) 
available at https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/05/memorandum-rescission-daca.  
Second, the United States argues that even if this Court determines it is prudent 
permit DACA recipients to practice law in Utah, a rule enacted by this Court 
cannot satisfy 1621(d) because “the phrase ‘enactment of a State law’ naturally 
connotes a statute passed by the state legislature.”  United States Br. at 10.  These 
arguments are each without merit. 
A. DACA Is Still in Effect and Regardless, Deferred Action Is Here 
to Stay 
The United States argues it would be imprudent for this Court to grant law 
licenses to undocumented immigrants “based on parameters of an exercise of 
enforcement discretion that DHS has concluded is unlawful and should, in any 
case, be abandoned.”  United States Br. at 8.  Of course, DACA has been in effect 
since 2012, and, as the United States concedes, multiple courts have enjoined 
DHS’s attempt to rescind the program.  United States Br. at 6 n.3 (citing cases); 
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ACLU Br. at 29 n.12 (citing cases).1  Most recently, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed a nationwide injunction, holding that 
plaintiffs are likely to prevail in establishing that DHS’s rescission of DACA on 
the ground that it is an “illegal” program is arbitrary and capricious: 
But after a change in presidential administrations, in 
2017 the government moved to end the DACA program. 
Why? According to the Acting Secretary of Homeland 
Security, upon the legal advice of the Attorney General, 
DACA was illegal from its inception, and therefore could 
no longer continue in effect. And after Dulce Garcia—
along with other DACA recipients and affected states, 
municipalities, and organizations—challenged this 
conclusion in the federal courts, the government adopted 
the position that its fundamentally legal determination 
that DACA is unlawful is unreviewable by the judicial 
branch.  With due respect for the Executive Branch, we 
disagree. 
The government may not simultaneously both assert that 
its actions are legally compelled, based on its 
interpretation of the law, and avoid review of that 
assertion by the judicial branch, whose “province and 
duty” it is “to say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).  The government’s 
decision to rescind DACA is subject to judicial review. 
And, upon review, we conclude that plaintiffs are likely 
to succeed on their claim that the rescission of DACA—
at least as justified on this record—is arbitrary, 
1 See generally National Immigration Law Center, Status of Current DACA 
Litigation, https://www.nilc.org/issues/daca/status-current-daca-litigation (last 
updated February 7, 2019). 
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capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with law. We 
therefore affirm the district court’s grant of preliminary 
injunctive relief. 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 486 
(9th Cir. 2018).  Further, despite DHS’s multiple filings for certiorari before 
judgment, the United States Supreme Court has not granted review in any of the 
pending DACA cases.  See United States Br. at 6 n.3.  Accordingly, DACA 
remains in effect and will likely remain in effect for some time regardless of 
DHS’s erroneous position that the policy is unlawful. 
Moreover, whether DHS is ultimately successful in rescinding DACA 
should have no bearing on whether this Court permits undocumented immigrants 
to practice law in Utah.  Any undocumented immigrant should be eligible for 
admission to the Utah State Bar if otherwise qualified and of good moral character.  
This includes individuals who have deferred action relief now and individuals who 
might obtain deferred action relief in the future.2  According to the United States 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), “[d]eferred action is a 
2  It could also include undocumented immigrants without deferred action 
relief.  The California Supreme Court took this approach and admitted Sergio C. 
Garcia to the California State Bar based on an immigration visa petition that had 
been pending for more than 19 years.  Mr. Garcia was not eligible for DACA 
because he was over the age of 30 when DHS adopted the policy.  In re Garcia, 58 
Cal.4th 440, 463 & n.18 (2014). 
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discretionary determination to defer a removal action of an individual as an act of 
prosecutorial discretion.”  USCIS, Frequently Asked Questions, 
https://www.uscis.gov/archive/frequently-asked-questions (last updated March 8, 
2018).  DHS considers individuals with deferred action relief to be lawfully present 
in the United States because “deferred action is a period of stay authorized by the 
Attorney General.”  Ariz. Dream Act Coal. v. Brewer, 757 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th
Cir. 2014); citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii); 8 C.F.R. 214.14(d)(3); U.S. 
Immigration and Naturalization Servs., Adjudicator’s Field Manual Ch. 
40.9.2(b)(3)(J). 
Deferred action is not an anomaly.  Deferred action has been available based 
on humanitarian considerations since at least as early as 1975, when the former 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) issued the following guidance:  
“Deferred action. In every case where the district director determines that adverse 
action would be unconscionable because of the existence of appealing 
humanitarian factors, he shall recommend consideration for deferred action 
category.”  INS, Operations Instructions, O.I. § 103.1(a)(1)(ii) (1975); see 
generally Shoba S. Wadhia, The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration 
Law, 9 Conn. Pub. L. J. 243 (2010) (reviewing the legal background and history of 
deferred action). The United States may grant deferred action relief on an ad hoc 
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basis or may target it at specific groups.  According to the National Immigration 
Forum, the United States has granted deferred action relief to targeted groups of 
undocumented immigrants at least 20 times since the 1970s, and at least five times 
since the late 1990s.  National Immigration Forum, Deferred Action Basics 
(April 15, 2016) https://immigrationforum.org/article/deferred-action-basics/.  
Accordingly, as long as deferred action continues to exist, there is no reason to 
deny individuals with deferred action relief the opportunity to practice law in Utah, 
regardless of whether one deferred action program—DACA—is rescinded by the 
United States. 
B. The Court Should Reject the United States’ Arguments 
The Court should reject the United States’ argument that Section 1621(d) 
requires the Legislature to take action.  As the United States itself concedes, “in 
many circumstances congressional references to state law can properly be 
understood to encompass any state provision with the force of law.”  United States 
Br. at 11.  But the United States, relying heavily on an unexplained sentence in 
House of Representatives Report No. 104-725 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), nevertheless 
maintains that Section 1621(d) does not permit this Court to enact a law opting out 
of Section 1621(a).  Of course, “Congress’s ‘authoritative statement is the statutory 
text, not the legislative history.’” Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 
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599 (2011) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 
568 (2005)); accord United States v. California, 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 11275 at 
*55 n.18, 2019 WL 1717075 (9th Cir. Apr. 18, 2019) (declining to credit the same 
conference report upon which the United States relies with respect to a different 
section of the Immigration and Nationality Act).   
Similarly misplaced is the United States’ reliance on the Florida Supreme 
Court’s advisory opinion in Florida Board of Bar Examiners Re: Questions as to 
Whether Undocumented Immigrants are Eligible for Admissions to the Florida 
Bar, 134 So. 3d 432 (Fla. 2014).  In that matter, the Florida Board of Bar 
Examiners asked the court for its opinion on whether a particular undocumented 
immigrant and similarly situated future applicants were eligible for admission 
under then-existing law.  Id. at 433.  Accordingly, the court surveyed existing 
Florida law and determined the applicant was ineligible because “there is no 
current State law that meets the requirements of section 1621(d) and permits this 
Court to issue a law license to an unauthorized immigrant.”  Id. at 435.  In contrast 
to this case, the Florida Supreme Court was not asked to adopt a rule granting to 
undocumented immigrants eligibility for bar admission, and neither analyzed nor 
concluded that adoption of such a rule would not satisfy Section 1621(d).  
Accordingly, the Florida Supreme Court’s “plain meaning” analysis of Section 
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1621(d) is dicta, cursory and incomplete.  Like the United States here, the court did 
not review the dictionary or statutory definitions of “enact” and “law,” address the 
multitude of other statutes that use words like “legislature” and “statute” explicitly, 
or consider the federalism clear-statement rule.  Id.; compare United States Br. at 
9-11 with ACLU Br. at 6-18, Attorney General Br. at 2-8, and Parr Brown Br. at 7-
9.   
Furthermore, the United States analogy to Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining 
and Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981) is based on a logical fallacy.  
Hodel involved a Tenth Amendment challenge to the Surface Mining Control and 
Reclamation Act of 1977 (“SMCRA”).  Like many environmental statutes passed 
in the 1960s and 1970s, SMCRA deploys a cooperative federalism approach under 
which states are expected to take the lead in surface mining regulation while the 
federal government oversees their efforts.  Under SMCRA, if a state demonstrates 
that it can effectively regulate surface mining on its own, the federal government 
may approve the state’s program.  In the absence of a state program, the federal 
Office of Surface Mining becomes responsible to regulate surface mining 
operations.  In Hodel, the Supreme Court ruled that this cooperative federalism 
approach to regulation does not violate the Tenth Amendment because the Tenth 
Amendment does not “limit congressional power to pre-empt or displace state 
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regulation of private activities affecting interstate commerce”—an area of express 
congressional authority.  Id. at 289-90. 
Of course, Section 1621 is not an attempt to pre-empt or displace state 
regulation of undocumented immigrants.  Federal law does not permit Utah to 
enforce its own immigration laws subject to federal oversight.  Instead, this section 
bars Utah from providing its own state public benefits to undocumented 
immigrants unless Utah chooses to “opt out” of the federal rule.  Utah’s only role 
is to decide whether to opt out, and the United States’ argument that Utah can only 
do so legislatively is an impermissible attempt to commandeer the very method by 
which Utah makes its choice.  Put another way, because Section 1621 purports to 
govern “how [Utah] can interact with the federal government, not the activities of 
private individuals, . . . Hodel is inapposite.”  United States v. California, 2019 
U.S. App. LEXIS 11275 at * 49 n.15, 2019 WL 1717075 (holding the federal 
government may not require California to cooperate in federal immigration 
enforcement efforts without violating the Tenth Amendment); see also Murphy v. 
NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1476 (2018) (“The Constitution . . . confers upon Congress 
the power to regulate individuals, not States.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
ACLU Br. at 26 n.11.  Section 1621(d) accordingly cannot, consistent with the 
requirements of the Tenth Amendment, be interpreted to mandate which branch of 
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Utah’s government may enact a law opting out of 1621(a)’s bar on professional 
licensure for undocumented immigrants. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court has the exclusive authority and discretion to “enact[] . . . a State 
law” permitting undocumented immigrants eligibility for admission to practice 
law.  The United States’ policy arguments are unpersuasive and its statutory 
analysis of Section 1621(d) is without merit and would, in any event, run afoul of 
the Tenth Amendment.  The Court should rejected the United States’ arguments 
and adopt the rule proposed by Petitioners.   
DATED this 25th day of April 2019. 
/s/ Anthony C. Kaye 
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